One usually associates elections with democracies in the modern world, not dictatorships. Competition in the political environment between varying parties is seen as a fundamental component of modern liberal democracies which, by their very nature, are an antithesis to dictatorships.[1] Dictatorships are characterized by a centralization and stranglehold on power by the ruling elite in that particular country.[2] The quote attributed to Lord Halisham[3] thus guides this essay in establishing the following about the political systems of the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA): (1) that whilst both the UK and the USA are democracies, the real level of power which the people exercise is little allowing those elected into office to dictate the state’s agenda; (2) that the limits on such governments’ powers is very little which further entrenches the dictatorial-like qualities of those elected regimes; and (3) that greater activism on the part of citizens is required to ensure that this turned (of increasing governmental power) is turned around. This essay will contend that whilst there is an elective element to these forms of government, that the way in which they operate (as a ruling party and as a government) essentially allows them dictator-like control over the state and exercise of power.[4]
Before turning to the analysis which this essay postulates, a brief outline describing the main characteristics of the UK and US political systems is necessary.
The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy with a King or Queen acting as the repository of power within the state. The monarch is a titular head of state in that whilst the government acts in his/her name and he/she officially has the power to call upon any person to form a government after the election,[5] this power is heavily constrained by the customs and laws which have developed over time to limit the power of the monarch. Such a custom is that the monarch calls upon the leader of the largest party in the Commons to form a government.[6] The Prime Minister then selects his Ministers[7] that will help him steer through his agenda for his term of office. Given that there are two chambers on the British political system, the Prime Minister usually divides his appointments of Ministers between both Houses in such a way to ensure that each Department is at least represented by one person in both Houses at any time. This transfer of power has occurred as the result of a long process of struggle fro primacy between the Monarch, the Commons and the Lords. Ultimately it is the Commons that has triumphed and now has the monopoly on power as a result of its success.[8]
In the United Kingdom, parliament is sovereign meaning that the Executive[9] is answerable to it. Whilst the monarch has the right to call upon any person to form a government[10] it is the sole prerogative of the House of Commons to dismiss it through the passing of a motion of no confidence against the government. This happened in 1979 when James Callaghan’s government lost a motion of no confidence by one vote. The reason that the Commons wields such power is three-fold: (1) it would be near impossible and impractical to hold a referendum on the performance of the incumbent government especially when considering that this would effectively be an election with no (binding) result;[11] (2) it is the democratically representative chamber and is said to exercise the will of the people; therefore according to the representative model of government the people that are chosen as the representatives of the electorate (MPs) must and will best exercise their judgment in such a way that it will be in the best interest of the voters and not use their position to serve themselves;[12] and (3) it is not beyond reproach for the way in which it exercises its power, unlike the Lords and the Monarchy both of which are not elected and are thus unaccountable to the electorate who are directly affected by such decisions.
The United Kingdom uses a first-past-the-post electoral system. This is a system whereby the country is divided into various constituencies of similar voting size.[13] In order to get elected to Parliament and represent any constituency as its MP, any person need only win the largest number of votes within their constituency from amongst all candidates. This means that after all constituencies have chosen their MP, the party with the most number of MPs/seats – not necessarily the highest number of votes – can form the government.[14]
The United States of America
The United States of Americ is very different to the United Kingdom primarily for the reason that the modern USA was founded out of a rejection of the UK and its political customs and traditions.[15] Accordingly it must come as no surprise that the USA has radically altered its political system tailoring it to its own needs.[16]
The USA is a constitutional republic which strictly adheres to the policy of a separation of powers between the Executive, the Legislature (Congress consisting of both the House of Representatives as the Lower House and the Senate as the Upper House) and the Judiciary.[17] It is a political system that does not allow for an over concentration of power in any single institution of government and implicitly supports the principle of checks and balances, namely the position where one institution cannot exercise so much power so as to achieve primacy over the other two.[18] Usually, in order for a law to be passed or any other state action to be considered legitimate, it requires that at least two of the institutions (the majority) have to work together.
The Executive branch of government is independent of the Legislature and is under the leadership of the President.[19] Unlike in parliamentary systems, the Executive is very powerful and has the (constitutional) scope and ability to carryout widespread political objectives except in certain circumstances – such as the passing of the Federal Budget – for which it is essential that the Executive receive the support of the Legislature as per the principle(s) illustrated above. Unlike in the United Kingdom specifically, the United States of America has a sovereign constitution which means that it is the express and implicit provisions of the Constitution that take primacy over the state and its actions. Whilst this may lead people to argue that the judiciary in this instance defies the principles set out above,[20] this is not really the case given the intrinsic involvement that the other two instructions play in the appointment of judges[21] – thus ensuring that the country becomes a ‘judocracy.’[22]
The USA is a federal system of government which means that power is devolved between the various levels of government at federal, state and local level.[23] Whilst this division is not mutually exclusive to the USA, this type of devolution in that the different spheres of government are autonomous to varying degrees and have complete/cooperative jurisdiction over certain issues as the constitution (and subsequent jurisprudence) provides for. The aim of this form of federalism is to locate power as close to the people as possible so that they may (1) be direct recipients of the exercise of such power; and (2) hold that sphere of government to account with the greatest ease ensuring that at all times it speaks to their own localized needs. Interestingly, states were not defined in the US Constitution but were seen as pre-existing components of the states considering the confederate history of the US and the subsequent wars that were fought to unit it. There are several arguments both in favour and against federalism which will be discussed at greater length later with respect to how it contributes to the US being an elective dictatorship.
Why Party Elites Control State Power Beyond that Invested in them by the Electorate
This essay will at no times argue that party elites (i.e. the highest decision-making bodies of political parties)[24] should not exercise power when they come into office. It is a sine qua non of governments from across the political divide as it makes administration easier and less complicated than having to have large decision-making bodies make important decisions despite their being subject to internal fighting and lobbying and jockeying for position. Whilst this is not mutually exclusive to larger decision-making bodies and may be present in smaller decision making bodies, as it often is, it is obvious that larger decision-making bodies are more susceptible to such conditions as they allow for a greater access to power and more movement within the group itself. A smaller decision-making body by its very nature requires a cohesive and unified body.[25]
However, the following mechanisms used by the party elites (discussed individually below) allow them to exercise an almost dictatorial-like power over the party machinery and thus allow them to exercise a similar power over the state.[26]
1. Systemic Reasons
There are reasons which allow party elites to control their own parties even where (a) the Members of the Party itself disagree with the decision of the party elite; or (b) where that decision may be unpopular with the electorate but the part elite manage to get it endorsed anyways.[27]
There are 2 primary systemic reasons.
Firstly, the party structure allows the elite a great degree of influence in the candidate-selection process. Whilst this may be hardly applicable to newcomers, it is important when dealing with incumbents who are seeking re-election: party loyalty may be used as a criterion to determine the overall performance of the candidate and whether they deserve re-selection. The danger with this kind of process is that it may intentionally be used against independent-minded candidates who rebel against the party elite by measuring such rebellions in a quantitative rather than qualitative way. This then ignores the reasons for which a person may vote against their own party (ignoring justifiability or popularity with the electorate)[28] and rather counts the mere number of times that they may have done so. This may however apply to newcomers in the sense that newcomers in order to be selected may be made to sign various pledges to the effect that they will not rebel against the party or alternatively, that they will be made to believe that if they were to rebel against the party they will have no such long term political career which one would believe is the underlying reason for their getting involved in the first place (in addition we hope to a willingness to serve the people).[29]
Secondly, once a representative is elected, their promotion depends on their performance which is linked to the way in which they are viewed by the party elite. It is unlikely that a rebel will be brought into government as they had previously been working against the very body which they are part of. Those in whom such powers of promotion are vested will avoid promoting such persons even if they are deserving of it by an objective standard, for the subjective reason that the representative concerned did so much damage to the government. This means that representatives who have the skill and capacity to go on to becoming Ministers are forced to choose between standing up for their principles or sitting doesn’t in favour of promotion. Whilst the party elite may benefit from keeping the rebel out, it is the people who suffer for it as the party elite then abuse their position of power to govern in their own interest rather than in the interest of the nation as a whole. Conversely, some leaders may intentionally bring rebels into the government as (i) bringing them into the government creates the perception that they are being listened to and often silences them in the public as they now have direct access to power and can raise their concern, etc in private (this is especially good for the government if the issue in question is popular with the electorate);[30] (ii) allowing the rebel the spoils of high public office then incentivizes them to support the government rather than oppose it for fear of losing out on those benefits which may make their political life (a) more prestigious; (b) more comfortable; and (c) more rewarding in the sense that the access to office allows them to better pursue and advocate their positions of interest. Such buy-in then allows their opposition to be muted.[31]
2. Patronage
Party elites when in office have access to vast sums of money through their control of government agencies and departments. This means that they have the ability to, under the guise of official government business,[32] allocate resources and money that they would not have had access to otherwise, to projects that have the ‘positive’ externality of securing the party’s (and thus their) primacy and future victory.[33] The government can do this through the strategic allocation of money to the different categories of seats that exist in its political system: (a) seats in which they hold the majority; (b) seats which they hold the majority by a narrow margin; (c) seats which they can win if there is a sufficient swing vote;[34] and (d) seats that they do not hold.
Party elites buy the silence (and non-opposition) of their own members by incentivizing collusion with the elite itself. Members who hold onto those respective categories of seats (category (a) and (b)) or who want to hold onto the seats (category (c) and (d)) are incentivized to work with the party elite rather than oppose them even where this may be the right/justified thing to do.[35] In each of these instances, the party elite has the ability to manipulate the desire for incumbency amongst its own members to ensure their discipline.[36]
This is owing to the fact that in category (a) seats, despite representatives enjoying a majority, representatives would be unwilling to stand up to the party for fear that (i) the party could withdraw its support for the individual representative which may have to trigger a by-election or alternatively which isolates that person from a traditional support base, their colleagues and friends, and the institutional support which the party offers its representatives; and (ii) their opposition to the party elite would result in them either becoming grossly unpopular in their constituency if the support that they enjoy is as a result of party loyalty amongst the voters rather than loyalty to the individual or alternatively being thrown out at the next election if their opposition starves their constituency from necessary resources. Whilst the calculation in the second instance is more risky for the party elite especially if they possess a slim majority, it may work out in its favour when considering the long term implications of that decision – namely getting rid of an uncooperative representative in favour of a loyalist party member that would not stand up the elite but rather support it. This is especially the case where elections happen regularly and there is little time between them so as to turn that constituency in its favour.
In category (b) seats, it is highly unlikely that these representatives would vote against the party elite due to their weakened position: namely that they are most vulnerable to changes in electorate behaviour as they have only managed to win their seats by small majorities. Standing up to their party elites – who bring with them vital infrastructure, funding contacts and experience – are huge disincentives to take such a risk. This is especially applicable to newcomers to the political game who the party elites select for those seats in the first place so as to ensure their dependency on the party elite insofar as fostering a long-term political career is concerned which in turn ensures their subsequent reliability (as payment for such support in the first place, to pay off the feeling of indebtedness); and secondly as they not want to take any risks that may jeopardize their long-term ambitions. These types of representatives are the most dangerous to have within a party as they often feel beholden to the party leadership who wield an inordinate amount of power over them: should they stand up to the leadership of the party, given their relative inexperience, it is unlikely that they shall succeed against another candidate that is endorsed by the party elite. This is also relevant in that the mere stigma of being dropped by the party establishment is enough to turn voters away as this is often interpreted negatively by the voting public. Should the person occupying this type of seat be older or of greater experience then a newcomer, it is not difficult to imagine that they would feel a greater sense of obligation towards the party elite as if they are the former, there is greater individual risk that they incur in getting involved in politics (especially if they are established in another field/industry as if often the case) and then having to leave after barely settling in, or the latter where they would have had little or no experience of the outside world and where their employability is limited to things political, jobs which are in and of themselves narrow to come by and probably do not carry as much influence, prestige and power as the incumbents are used to.
In category (c) seats, we see that there is a direct interest of the party elite to allocate resources to these areas. This is owing to the fact that if the government is to ensure that any developments in that locality are associated with them and not the incumbent representative, they create the perception that the incumbent and the role he plays in securing them such services is obsolete. This builds up party loyalty which can translate into an election victory at the next election where the marhin of victory for the incumbent is narrow. Further, and interestingly, incumbents in these types of seats also have a difficult time in repudiating the government’s efforts as if they were to do so and the quality of life in those localities were to decrease, then the incumbent would be directly responsible in the eyes of the electorate. Conversely, if he encourages the government, he runs the risk of either seeming to be a sell-out to the other side which disincentivizes the voters he could have normally depended upon to vote for him in future (thus increasing the proportional size and chance of any challenger to unseat him)[37] or making himself obsolete in the process as the government would be supplanting his presence in his constituency. Challengers (from the same party as the ruling party) who then manage to take seats like this in future elections then move from being in category (c) seats to category (b) seats and for which the analysis above would then apply to them.
Category (d) seats are the most interesting types of seats. This is owing to the fact that the government could try a similar approach to the category (c) seats to this category but the prospects of success are very minimal. However, because these seats do not exist in isolation and form part of the rest of the country and whose socio-economic circumstances may need the help and input from the central government, we see that these bastions of the opposition party are also allowed to be co-opted into the ‘electoral dictatorship’ given that they have a vested interest in ensuring that their respective constituencies are granted the money and programmes that are necessary to for them to improve and which have the positive externality of increasing those representative’s popularity. This is typified by the USA’s Blue Dogs.[38] In this particular instance we see that the constituency-based electoral system allows the individual representatives to break with a uniform position taken by the party leadership when it is in the best interest of their electors (usually a good thing) but that this can be manipulated by the government when applied to opposition members and buying their cooperation on a series of issues in exchange for listening to them on others.
In each of the above examples we see that party elites are able to go to great lengths to limit the opposition they face and thus behave as ‘electoral dictatorships.’ Through the manipulation of the incentives that exist for representatives we see that they are able to solidly their own primacy and ensure that both members of their own party and members of the opposition buy-in to their programmes through the offering of various awards that are necessary for them insofar as ensuring that service delivery (both perceived and actual) occurs.[39]
Can the Judiciary Limit the Power of the Electoral Dictatorship?
Whilst in both the UK and the USA the judiciary has the power and the ability to overturn the decisions of the government[40] (which we have referred to as the electoral dictatorship) in reality we find that this power is greatly undermined by three factors.
Firstly, the Judiciary is incentivized as an institution to remain in tune with and give effect to popular trends within society. This occurs in two ways: through assimilation and application. With respect to assimilation, judges do not exist in isolation to society. They are influenced by the discourse within any state and further are subject to their own beliefs and prejudices. Accordingly, they may have an inherent political bias or prejudice towards the government. In the case of the former, the result of this is that the judiciary continues to be seen as a legitimate institution which gives express view to the opinions of the majority. In the case of the latter (or where the interpretation of law given by the judges is discordant with the popular views in society) there is the propensity for the judiciary as an institution to become increasingly obsolete either through their own doing (as the gap between normative concepts of rights and the reality of daily life increases) or through sustained governmental attack – which the government is not above doing especially where the judiciary stands in the way of it monopolizing its political power and legitimacy. We see therefore that these choices (and the opportunity cost) of making such decisions which pits the judiciary against the government acts as a direct disincentive for the judiciary to not undermine the power of the ‘electoral dictatorship.’[41]
Secondly, in both the UK and the USA, both the incumbent governments have great influence within the appointment process of judges. This in and of itself seems, prima facie, to be in violation of the separation of powers principle. The government as an institution should not be allowed to appoint those judicial officers who in the future may need to hold that same government to account. Whilst insulated by things such as security of tenure and arduous procedures through which they may be removed from office, this does not eliminate the propensity for these judicial officers to use their office in favour of the government which allowed them to ascend to the pinnacle of their career. Whilst subject to public scrutiny, we see it is those same safeguards that protect the judiciary from open and unadulterated interference that also protects them from open and unadulterated critique (even though such may be justified). This is further emphasised by the fact that any judge who manages to get appointed, particular in the USA, where they are subject to intense politicalization of the appointment process are not only an aggregation of political interest from opposite ends of the spectrum, but also a compromise candidate who may not feel comfortable kicking their gift horse in the mouth.
Thirdly, judicial undermining of the government gives rise to the counter-majoritarian dilemma. This speaks to the situation where the judiciary, through a strict or unpopular interpretation of the Constitution is said to effectively disallow the ‘will of the majority’ to be given effect to by their elected representatives. In such a case judicial authority disallows the express will of the majority of the people – which is a fundamental tenet of democracy. Further, there is the problem of the democratic deficit. This is similar to the problem of counter-majoritariansim in that it highlights the problem with the judiciary in that they have no real sense of accountability to the elected structures of government.[42] In each instance, the judiciary is disincentivized from undermining the government as it realises the importance of an engaging electorate which, if they continue to undermine the government they have elected, they may contribute to increasing the apathy amongst voters.[43] This in and of itself is bad owing to the fact that a minority government may come to power as the proportional sizes of voting support groups changes (increases in relation to others) whereas actual numbers of voters decreases.[44]
Can Greater Voter Activism Turn this Trend Around?
Two primary examples of voter involvement show that there is potential for the turn-around of political elitism in the UK and the US. Militant Tendency[45] and the Tea Party Movement[46] respectively. Without going into the merits of each movement (which lie outside the scope of this essay), there are two conclusions that the establishment of these movements can show us:
Firstly, that grassroots organisation and infiltration tactics of the establishment parties can bring about change. Whether that change is sporadic or sustained depends on whether or not the persons committed to these movements are willing to subject themselves to possible marginalization by the party elites. If they are willing to withstand such pressures, the movements may be successful in allowing for a repositioning of the party to which they are attached. The success of such repositioning with respect to winning votes depends yet again on the considerations of the circumstances in which the exist, however the mere fact that it happens (i) peaks voters interests as to the party and its matters; and (ii) acts as an incentive for other moderates/people who are not involved to get involved as it demonstrates that their involvement within the party is not for no reason at all and that they may attain some degree of success.
Secondly, that party elites respond to such pressures only when they themselves and their primacy within the organisation (irrespective of whether they are in government or in opposition) are challenged.[47] The threat of losing their incumbency and the access that it allows to further opportunities means that when people threaten that – and in the case of voters when they vote strategically to put pressure on their representatives – party representatives are more likely to feel beholden to those issuing the threat. In the case of voters, this undermines the party elite and ensures that representative democratic model of government is given greater effect to.[48]
Conclusion
Even though one associates democracies with competitive elections, this essay has shown that in certain circumstances, specifically in the case of the UK and the USA, the governments are dictatorial in nature despite the fact that they may have been elected into office. Even though there may be elements of competition in these systems, it is difficult to ensure that the true intention so voters will always be spoken to by elected representatives. The complete hold on power which they enjoy and the lengths to which they are willing to go in order to ensure their incumbency and primcy through manipulating the incentives of individuals from their own and other parties indicates that Lord Hailsham’s critique of modern governments in accurate and applicable.
[1] Democracies are governments in which “supreme power is vested in the people and exercised directly by them or by their elected agents under a free electoral system.” http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/democracy.
[2] Dictatorships are a system of government where the rulers of that country exercise “absolute, imperious, or overbearing power or control” over the rest of the population. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/dictatorships.
[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quintin_Hogg,_Baron_Hailsham_of_St_Marylebone.
[4] Jones, P. R. and Cullis, J. G. 1986. Is Democracy Regressive? Public Choice. Vol 51. No 1. pp 101 – 107.
[5] It is convention from the 20th century onwards that the Prime Minister should be a Member of Parliament sitting in the House of Commons. This is such a strong convention of the British political system that the last Prime Minister who was appointed whilst in the House of Lords, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, renounced his membership of the upper House so that he could contest a by-election to sit as an MP in the House of Commons which he did. This is symbolic of the modern development in the British system that it is the House Commons – as the chamber most representative of the Commoners/everyday men and women of the United Kingdom – which has the moral and political legitimacy to exercise power and govern the country given its election by to that position.
[6] Should he be unable to do so given that he does not command a Commons majority (i.e. his party has the most number of seats in the Commons but does not have an outright majority) he is entitled to form a coalition that would be in the majority. This is what happened this year after the results of the UK 2010 General Election allowed the Conservative Party to hold the most number of seats in the Commons whilst falling short of an absolute majority. The Rt. Hon. David Cameron MP (the leader of the Conservative Party and now the Prime Minister) was called by HRH Queen Elizabeth II form a government, which he did despite his lack of an absolute majority as he had previously agreed to form a coalition with the Liberal Democrats (under the leadership of The Rt. Hon. Nick Clegg MP) which allowed both parties sitting together to command a Commons majority. This is seen as a better alternative to forming a minority government where the party with the largest number of seats but not an absolute majority attempts to govern for as long as it can until such time that it looses the confidence of the House upon which it relies to carry out its political programme. Such was the case with the government of The Rt. Hon. James Callaghan MP.
[7] Secretaries of State (and other invited persons, such as the Chief Whip) being entitled to sit in the Cabinet and are allowed to be referred to as “the Right Honourable” by virtue of their appointnment to the Privy Council; Ministers of State (some of whom may be appointed to the Privy Council for special reasons such as sharing a close political connection to the Prime Minister or for long service, as in the case of The Rt. Hon. Oliver Letwin MP) who serve in various Departments under Secretaries of State; Under-Secretaries who serve below Secretaries of State and Ministers; and Private Parliamentary Secretaries who are not official government Members but who provide political assistance to Secretaries of State/Ministers as the case may be.
[8] For a brief history on the history of Parliament see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Commons_of_the_United_Kingdom.
[9] i.e. the Prime Minister and his Government.
[10] Note 4 supra.
[11] Wolbrecht, C. and Campbell, D. E. 2007. Female Members of Parliament as Political Role Models. American Journal of Political Science. Vol 51. No 4 (October).
[12]Indeed when it comes to voting against their own party in a motion of no confidence (possible although not often the case), MPs are expected to be selfless as they are expected to dismiss a government if they are deserving of it even though (a) they may be voting against their own party (and friends); or (b) the onset of a new general election – which a successful motion of no confidence initiates as a method of replacing the government in which the Commons as the representative chamber of the people – may result in them losing their own seat (especially if on the losing side).
[13] i.e. with a similar number of electors although not necessarily the same size geographically.
[14] Joyce, Peter. 2006. Teach Yourself: Politics. Reading, Berkshire. Hodder Education.
[15] Pancer, S. M., Brown, S. D. and Barr, C. W. 1999. Forming Impressions of Political Leaders: A Cross-national Comparison. Political Psychology. Vol 20. No 2 (June). pp 345 – 368
[16] Heywood, Andrew. 2007. Politics (Third Edition). Hampshire and New York. Palgrave Macmillan
[17] http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/separation-of-powers.html.
[18] http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/checks+and+balances.
[19] This further reemphasises the separation of powers doctrine as the President may be of one party and the Legislature may be in the control of the other. This allows a further bulwark against the overwhelming powers of the Executive and vice versa. This was the case with President Bush post-2006 midterm elections where his own Republican party lost control of Congress to the Democrats which allowed the Democrats to then use their position as an opposition party in control of Congress to curtail the President’s programmes initiative which they – and seemingly the electorate – were opposed to by virtue of being elected as the majority. The positive externality of this system of government is that it allows the electorate to curtail the powers of the President midterm (as happened with Bush Jnr. in 2006, his term ending in 2008) without having to necessarily incur the expense and the logistical burden of a general election. It also acts simultaneously as a referendum on the president’s performance thus far – a poor result indicating that more work would need to be done to secure a second term/that his or her predecessor from their own party has a better chance of winning; whilst a good result boosts the President’s legitimacy and chances of re-election (or in the case of a second-term President, the chances of allowing his own party replacement to succeed him). This happened to Presidents Clinton and Bush Jnr.
[20]See an example of this at http://theweeklywhip.blogspot.com/2010/05/judicial-independence-in-south-africa.html (concerning South Africa’s Superior Courts Bill [2006] and a possible argument as to why the judiciary wields too much power in a democracy).
[21] Note 14 supra for further arguments as to why judicial independence is both legally and politically sound in a democracy.
[22] http://www.indianexpress.com/oldStory/6058/.
[23] Wilson, J. 2008. American Government. USA, Houghton Mifflin Company.
[24] In the UK where there is a more rigid and unitary party structure, this usually refers to the Leader of the Party and his Executive structure of the party – many of whom sit in the government as Cabinet Ministers, etc. In the US this is somewhat different given the country’s federal nature and refers to the decision-makers at the highest level of the part who collude with each other to ensure that the President is able to carry out his agenda. This extends to State Party formations which may use their influence and control to reign in errant Senators/Congressman who threaten the President’s primacy.
[25] Caprara, G. V., Barbarnelli, C. and Zimbardo, P. G. 1999. Personality Profiles of Political Parties. Political Psychology. Vol 20. No 1 (March). pp 175 – 197.
[26] It is important to bear in mind that in the UK the government usually sits with a majority. This means that an opposition will only be successful in managing to defeat the government – even where the government deserves to be defeated – if members of the ruling party (usually those on the backbench) turn against their own leadership. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/2802791.stm for a chronicle of the rebellions that were suffered by the Blair Government. Despite none of them being successful (although many of them should have been) it illustrates to what degree the party elites are able to silence internal dissent when it is often the only type of dissent that may succeed. This essay will point out a t a later stage as to how this will not even happen in the case of a coalition despite the propensity for disagreement as is the case currently in the UK. In the United States, whilst this is not always the case (that the President and his party are in control of both the Presidency and Congress at the same time), we see that: (a) in scenarios that they are, the issues pointed out to by this essay occur anyways; and (b) in scenarios where they are not, the President still has the ability to court members of the opposite party to assist him for whatever reason (explained later) to get his initiatives passed through Congress.
[27]Howard, P. N. 2005. Deep Democracy, Thin Citizenship: The Impact of Digital Media in Political Campaign Strategy. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol 597 (January). pp 153-170
[28] Parties may do this even if it means losing a seat for one election cycle so that they can get rid of persons they deem damaging to their cause.
[29] Williams, P. 2004. Who’s Making UK Foreign Policy. International Affairs (Royal Institute for International Affairs 1944 – ). Vol 80. No 5 (October). pp 911 – 929.
[30] See John Major’s appropriation of Linden B. Johnson’s maxim: it’s better to have the bastards in the tent pissing out, than outside pissing in.” http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/1993/jul/25/politicalnews.uk.
[31] Crowley, J. 2001. The Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities. International Political Science Review. Vol 2. No 1 (Jan). pp 99 – 121.
[32] Which is supposed to be non-partisan by virtue of the fact that it is done on behalf of the state that is supposed to be equally accessed by all people living within the state as well as to provide to them.
[33] Referred to as “pork barrelling” in the USA. http://www.answers.com/topic/pork-barrel.
[34] http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Swing+vote.
[35] Klein, Joe. 2006. Politics Lost. New York. Broadway Books.
[36] Dworkin, R. 2006. Is Democracy Possible Here? Princeton University Press. New Jersey. Princeton.
[37] This obviously ignores the wrath he would face of his party colleagues that may or may not take kindly his so-called collusion.
[38] http://www.c-span.org/guide/congress/glossary/bluedog.htm.
[39] Novkov, J. 2008. Rethinking Race in American Politics. Political Research Quarterly. Vol 61. No 4 (December). pp 649 – 659.
[40] In the UK this is through the application of legislation such as the Human Rights Act 1998 which gave effect to supranational legislation (European Convention on Human Rights) that allows for such a power. In the USA, much like in South Africa, the power of judicial review is guaranteed by the Constitution.
[41] Kennedy, H. 2004. Just Law. Vintage. Great Britain. London
[42] Both the ‘counter-majoritarian dilemma’ and the ‘democratic-deficit’ are explained in Corder, H. 2009. Judicial Authority in a Changing South Africa. University of Cape Town..
[43] Aarts, K. and Semetko, H. A. 2003. The Divided Electorate: Media Use and Political Involvement. The Journal of Politics. Vol 65. No 3 (August). pp 759 – 784.
[44] Sanders, D. and Norris, P. 2005. The Impact of Political Advertising in the 2001 UK General Election. Political Research Quarterly. Vol 58. No 4 (December). pp 525 – 536.
[45] http://www.militant.org.uk/.
[46] http://teapartypatriots.ning.com/.
[47] Holcombe, R. G. 2005. Government Growth in the Twenty-First Century. Public Choice. Vol 124. No 1/2 (July). pp 95 – 114.
[48] Yule, V. 1985. Representative Government. Political Psychology. Vol 6. No 3 (September). pp 519 – 524.
Before turning to the analysis which this essay postulates, a brief outline describing the main characteristics of the UK and US political systems is necessary.
The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy with a King or Queen acting as the repository of power within the state. The monarch is a titular head of state in that whilst the government acts in his/her name and he/she officially has the power to call upon any person to form a government after the election,[5] this power is heavily constrained by the customs and laws which have developed over time to limit the power of the monarch. Such a custom is that the monarch calls upon the leader of the largest party in the Commons to form a government.[6] The Prime Minister then selects his Ministers[7] that will help him steer through his agenda for his term of office. Given that there are two chambers on the British political system, the Prime Minister usually divides his appointments of Ministers between both Houses in such a way to ensure that each Department is at least represented by one person in both Houses at any time. This transfer of power has occurred as the result of a long process of struggle fro primacy between the Monarch, the Commons and the Lords. Ultimately it is the Commons that has triumphed and now has the monopoly on power as a result of its success.[8]
In the United Kingdom, parliament is sovereign meaning that the Executive[9] is answerable to it. Whilst the monarch has the right to call upon any person to form a government[10] it is the sole prerogative of the House of Commons to dismiss it through the passing of a motion of no confidence against the government. This happened in 1979 when James Callaghan’s government lost a motion of no confidence by one vote. The reason that the Commons wields such power is three-fold: (1) it would be near impossible and impractical to hold a referendum on the performance of the incumbent government especially when considering that this would effectively be an election with no (binding) result;[11] (2) it is the democratically representative chamber and is said to exercise the will of the people; therefore according to the representative model of government the people that are chosen as the representatives of the electorate (MPs) must and will best exercise their judgment in such a way that it will be in the best interest of the voters and not use their position to serve themselves;[12] and (3) it is not beyond reproach for the way in which it exercises its power, unlike the Lords and the Monarchy both of which are not elected and are thus unaccountable to the electorate who are directly affected by such decisions.
The United Kingdom uses a first-past-the-post electoral system. This is a system whereby the country is divided into various constituencies of similar voting size.[13] In order to get elected to Parliament and represent any constituency as its MP, any person need only win the largest number of votes within their constituency from amongst all candidates. This means that after all constituencies have chosen their MP, the party with the most number of MPs/seats – not necessarily the highest number of votes – can form the government.[14]
The United States of America
The United States of Americ is very different to the United Kingdom primarily for the reason that the modern USA was founded out of a rejection of the UK and its political customs and traditions.[15] Accordingly it must come as no surprise that the USA has radically altered its political system tailoring it to its own needs.[16]
The USA is a constitutional republic which strictly adheres to the policy of a separation of powers between the Executive, the Legislature (Congress consisting of both the House of Representatives as the Lower House and the Senate as the Upper House) and the Judiciary.[17] It is a political system that does not allow for an over concentration of power in any single institution of government and implicitly supports the principle of checks and balances, namely the position where one institution cannot exercise so much power so as to achieve primacy over the other two.[18] Usually, in order for a law to be passed or any other state action to be considered legitimate, it requires that at least two of the institutions (the majority) have to work together.
The Executive branch of government is independent of the Legislature and is under the leadership of the President.[19] Unlike in parliamentary systems, the Executive is very powerful and has the (constitutional) scope and ability to carryout widespread political objectives except in certain circumstances – such as the passing of the Federal Budget – for which it is essential that the Executive receive the support of the Legislature as per the principle(s) illustrated above. Unlike in the United Kingdom specifically, the United States of America has a sovereign constitution which means that it is the express and implicit provisions of the Constitution that take primacy over the state and its actions. Whilst this may lead people to argue that the judiciary in this instance defies the principles set out above,[20] this is not really the case given the intrinsic involvement that the other two instructions play in the appointment of judges[21] – thus ensuring that the country becomes a ‘judocracy.’[22]
The USA is a federal system of government which means that power is devolved between the various levels of government at federal, state and local level.[23] Whilst this division is not mutually exclusive to the USA, this type of devolution in that the different spheres of government are autonomous to varying degrees and have complete/cooperative jurisdiction over certain issues as the constitution (and subsequent jurisprudence) provides for. The aim of this form of federalism is to locate power as close to the people as possible so that they may (1) be direct recipients of the exercise of such power; and (2) hold that sphere of government to account with the greatest ease ensuring that at all times it speaks to their own localized needs. Interestingly, states were not defined in the US Constitution but were seen as pre-existing components of the states considering the confederate history of the US and the subsequent wars that were fought to unit it. There are several arguments both in favour and against federalism which will be discussed at greater length later with respect to how it contributes to the US being an elective dictatorship.
Why Party Elites Control State Power Beyond that Invested in them by the Electorate
This essay will at no times argue that party elites (i.e. the highest decision-making bodies of political parties)[24] should not exercise power when they come into office. It is a sine qua non of governments from across the political divide as it makes administration easier and less complicated than having to have large decision-making bodies make important decisions despite their being subject to internal fighting and lobbying and jockeying for position. Whilst this is not mutually exclusive to larger decision-making bodies and may be present in smaller decision making bodies, as it often is, it is obvious that larger decision-making bodies are more susceptible to such conditions as they allow for a greater access to power and more movement within the group itself. A smaller decision-making body by its very nature requires a cohesive and unified body.[25]
However, the following mechanisms used by the party elites (discussed individually below) allow them to exercise an almost dictatorial-like power over the party machinery and thus allow them to exercise a similar power over the state.[26]
1. Systemic Reasons
There are reasons which allow party elites to control their own parties even where (a) the Members of the Party itself disagree with the decision of the party elite; or (b) where that decision may be unpopular with the electorate but the part elite manage to get it endorsed anyways.[27]
There are 2 primary systemic reasons.
Firstly, the party structure allows the elite a great degree of influence in the candidate-selection process. Whilst this may be hardly applicable to newcomers, it is important when dealing with incumbents who are seeking re-election: party loyalty may be used as a criterion to determine the overall performance of the candidate and whether they deserve re-selection. The danger with this kind of process is that it may intentionally be used against independent-minded candidates who rebel against the party elite by measuring such rebellions in a quantitative rather than qualitative way. This then ignores the reasons for which a person may vote against their own party (ignoring justifiability or popularity with the electorate)[28] and rather counts the mere number of times that they may have done so. This may however apply to newcomers in the sense that newcomers in order to be selected may be made to sign various pledges to the effect that they will not rebel against the party or alternatively, that they will be made to believe that if they were to rebel against the party they will have no such long term political career which one would believe is the underlying reason for their getting involved in the first place (in addition we hope to a willingness to serve the people).[29]
Secondly, once a representative is elected, their promotion depends on their performance which is linked to the way in which they are viewed by the party elite. It is unlikely that a rebel will be brought into government as they had previously been working against the very body which they are part of. Those in whom such powers of promotion are vested will avoid promoting such persons even if they are deserving of it by an objective standard, for the subjective reason that the representative concerned did so much damage to the government. This means that representatives who have the skill and capacity to go on to becoming Ministers are forced to choose between standing up for their principles or sitting doesn’t in favour of promotion. Whilst the party elite may benefit from keeping the rebel out, it is the people who suffer for it as the party elite then abuse their position of power to govern in their own interest rather than in the interest of the nation as a whole. Conversely, some leaders may intentionally bring rebels into the government as (i) bringing them into the government creates the perception that they are being listened to and often silences them in the public as they now have direct access to power and can raise their concern, etc in private (this is especially good for the government if the issue in question is popular with the electorate);[30] (ii) allowing the rebel the spoils of high public office then incentivizes them to support the government rather than oppose it for fear of losing out on those benefits which may make their political life (a) more prestigious; (b) more comfortable; and (c) more rewarding in the sense that the access to office allows them to better pursue and advocate their positions of interest. Such buy-in then allows their opposition to be muted.[31]
2. Patronage
Party elites when in office have access to vast sums of money through their control of government agencies and departments. This means that they have the ability to, under the guise of official government business,[32] allocate resources and money that they would not have had access to otherwise, to projects that have the ‘positive’ externality of securing the party’s (and thus their) primacy and future victory.[33] The government can do this through the strategic allocation of money to the different categories of seats that exist in its political system: (a) seats in which they hold the majority; (b) seats which they hold the majority by a narrow margin; (c) seats which they can win if there is a sufficient swing vote;[34] and (d) seats that they do not hold.
Party elites buy the silence (and non-opposition) of their own members by incentivizing collusion with the elite itself. Members who hold onto those respective categories of seats (category (a) and (b)) or who want to hold onto the seats (category (c) and (d)) are incentivized to work with the party elite rather than oppose them even where this may be the right/justified thing to do.[35] In each of these instances, the party elite has the ability to manipulate the desire for incumbency amongst its own members to ensure their discipline.[36]
This is owing to the fact that in category (a) seats, despite representatives enjoying a majority, representatives would be unwilling to stand up to the party for fear that (i) the party could withdraw its support for the individual representative which may have to trigger a by-election or alternatively which isolates that person from a traditional support base, their colleagues and friends, and the institutional support which the party offers its representatives; and (ii) their opposition to the party elite would result in them either becoming grossly unpopular in their constituency if the support that they enjoy is as a result of party loyalty amongst the voters rather than loyalty to the individual or alternatively being thrown out at the next election if their opposition starves their constituency from necessary resources. Whilst the calculation in the second instance is more risky for the party elite especially if they possess a slim majority, it may work out in its favour when considering the long term implications of that decision – namely getting rid of an uncooperative representative in favour of a loyalist party member that would not stand up the elite but rather support it. This is especially the case where elections happen regularly and there is little time between them so as to turn that constituency in its favour.
In category (b) seats, it is highly unlikely that these representatives would vote against the party elite due to their weakened position: namely that they are most vulnerable to changes in electorate behaviour as they have only managed to win their seats by small majorities. Standing up to their party elites – who bring with them vital infrastructure, funding contacts and experience – are huge disincentives to take such a risk. This is especially applicable to newcomers to the political game who the party elites select for those seats in the first place so as to ensure their dependency on the party elite insofar as fostering a long-term political career is concerned which in turn ensures their subsequent reliability (as payment for such support in the first place, to pay off the feeling of indebtedness); and secondly as they not want to take any risks that may jeopardize their long-term ambitions. These types of representatives are the most dangerous to have within a party as they often feel beholden to the party leadership who wield an inordinate amount of power over them: should they stand up to the leadership of the party, given their relative inexperience, it is unlikely that they shall succeed against another candidate that is endorsed by the party elite. This is also relevant in that the mere stigma of being dropped by the party establishment is enough to turn voters away as this is often interpreted negatively by the voting public. Should the person occupying this type of seat be older or of greater experience then a newcomer, it is not difficult to imagine that they would feel a greater sense of obligation towards the party elite as if they are the former, there is greater individual risk that they incur in getting involved in politics (especially if they are established in another field/industry as if often the case) and then having to leave after barely settling in, or the latter where they would have had little or no experience of the outside world and where their employability is limited to things political, jobs which are in and of themselves narrow to come by and probably do not carry as much influence, prestige and power as the incumbents are used to.
In category (c) seats, we see that there is a direct interest of the party elite to allocate resources to these areas. This is owing to the fact that if the government is to ensure that any developments in that locality are associated with them and not the incumbent representative, they create the perception that the incumbent and the role he plays in securing them such services is obsolete. This builds up party loyalty which can translate into an election victory at the next election where the marhin of victory for the incumbent is narrow. Further, and interestingly, incumbents in these types of seats also have a difficult time in repudiating the government’s efforts as if they were to do so and the quality of life in those localities were to decrease, then the incumbent would be directly responsible in the eyes of the electorate. Conversely, if he encourages the government, he runs the risk of either seeming to be a sell-out to the other side which disincentivizes the voters he could have normally depended upon to vote for him in future (thus increasing the proportional size and chance of any challenger to unseat him)[37] or making himself obsolete in the process as the government would be supplanting his presence in his constituency. Challengers (from the same party as the ruling party) who then manage to take seats like this in future elections then move from being in category (c) seats to category (b) seats and for which the analysis above would then apply to them.
Category (d) seats are the most interesting types of seats. This is owing to the fact that the government could try a similar approach to the category (c) seats to this category but the prospects of success are very minimal. However, because these seats do not exist in isolation and form part of the rest of the country and whose socio-economic circumstances may need the help and input from the central government, we see that these bastions of the opposition party are also allowed to be co-opted into the ‘electoral dictatorship’ given that they have a vested interest in ensuring that their respective constituencies are granted the money and programmes that are necessary to for them to improve and which have the positive externality of increasing those representative’s popularity. This is typified by the USA’s Blue Dogs.[38] In this particular instance we see that the constituency-based electoral system allows the individual representatives to break with a uniform position taken by the party leadership when it is in the best interest of their electors (usually a good thing) but that this can be manipulated by the government when applied to opposition members and buying their cooperation on a series of issues in exchange for listening to them on others.
In each of the above examples we see that party elites are able to go to great lengths to limit the opposition they face and thus behave as ‘electoral dictatorships.’ Through the manipulation of the incentives that exist for representatives we see that they are able to solidly their own primacy and ensure that both members of their own party and members of the opposition buy-in to their programmes through the offering of various awards that are necessary for them insofar as ensuring that service delivery (both perceived and actual) occurs.[39]
Can the Judiciary Limit the Power of the Electoral Dictatorship?
Whilst in both the UK and the USA the judiciary has the power and the ability to overturn the decisions of the government[40] (which we have referred to as the electoral dictatorship) in reality we find that this power is greatly undermined by three factors.
Firstly, the Judiciary is incentivized as an institution to remain in tune with and give effect to popular trends within society. This occurs in two ways: through assimilation and application. With respect to assimilation, judges do not exist in isolation to society. They are influenced by the discourse within any state and further are subject to their own beliefs and prejudices. Accordingly, they may have an inherent political bias or prejudice towards the government. In the case of the former, the result of this is that the judiciary continues to be seen as a legitimate institution which gives express view to the opinions of the majority. In the case of the latter (or where the interpretation of law given by the judges is discordant with the popular views in society) there is the propensity for the judiciary as an institution to become increasingly obsolete either through their own doing (as the gap between normative concepts of rights and the reality of daily life increases) or through sustained governmental attack – which the government is not above doing especially where the judiciary stands in the way of it monopolizing its political power and legitimacy. We see therefore that these choices (and the opportunity cost) of making such decisions which pits the judiciary against the government acts as a direct disincentive for the judiciary to not undermine the power of the ‘electoral dictatorship.’[41]
Secondly, in both the UK and the USA, both the incumbent governments have great influence within the appointment process of judges. This in and of itself seems, prima facie, to be in violation of the separation of powers principle. The government as an institution should not be allowed to appoint those judicial officers who in the future may need to hold that same government to account. Whilst insulated by things such as security of tenure and arduous procedures through which they may be removed from office, this does not eliminate the propensity for these judicial officers to use their office in favour of the government which allowed them to ascend to the pinnacle of their career. Whilst subject to public scrutiny, we see it is those same safeguards that protect the judiciary from open and unadulterated interference that also protects them from open and unadulterated critique (even though such may be justified). This is further emphasised by the fact that any judge who manages to get appointed, particular in the USA, where they are subject to intense politicalization of the appointment process are not only an aggregation of political interest from opposite ends of the spectrum, but also a compromise candidate who may not feel comfortable kicking their gift horse in the mouth.
Thirdly, judicial undermining of the government gives rise to the counter-majoritarian dilemma. This speaks to the situation where the judiciary, through a strict or unpopular interpretation of the Constitution is said to effectively disallow the ‘will of the majority’ to be given effect to by their elected representatives. In such a case judicial authority disallows the express will of the majority of the people – which is a fundamental tenet of democracy. Further, there is the problem of the democratic deficit. This is similar to the problem of counter-majoritariansim in that it highlights the problem with the judiciary in that they have no real sense of accountability to the elected structures of government.[42] In each instance, the judiciary is disincentivized from undermining the government as it realises the importance of an engaging electorate which, if they continue to undermine the government they have elected, they may contribute to increasing the apathy amongst voters.[43] This in and of itself is bad owing to the fact that a minority government may come to power as the proportional sizes of voting support groups changes (increases in relation to others) whereas actual numbers of voters decreases.[44]
Can Greater Voter Activism Turn this Trend Around?
Two primary examples of voter involvement show that there is potential for the turn-around of political elitism in the UK and the US. Militant Tendency[45] and the Tea Party Movement[46] respectively. Without going into the merits of each movement (which lie outside the scope of this essay), there are two conclusions that the establishment of these movements can show us:
Firstly, that grassroots organisation and infiltration tactics of the establishment parties can bring about change. Whether that change is sporadic or sustained depends on whether or not the persons committed to these movements are willing to subject themselves to possible marginalization by the party elites. If they are willing to withstand such pressures, the movements may be successful in allowing for a repositioning of the party to which they are attached. The success of such repositioning with respect to winning votes depends yet again on the considerations of the circumstances in which the exist, however the mere fact that it happens (i) peaks voters interests as to the party and its matters; and (ii) acts as an incentive for other moderates/people who are not involved to get involved as it demonstrates that their involvement within the party is not for no reason at all and that they may attain some degree of success.
Secondly, that party elites respond to such pressures only when they themselves and their primacy within the organisation (irrespective of whether they are in government or in opposition) are challenged.[47] The threat of losing their incumbency and the access that it allows to further opportunities means that when people threaten that – and in the case of voters when they vote strategically to put pressure on their representatives – party representatives are more likely to feel beholden to those issuing the threat. In the case of voters, this undermines the party elite and ensures that representative democratic model of government is given greater effect to.[48]
Conclusion
Even though one associates democracies with competitive elections, this essay has shown that in certain circumstances, specifically in the case of the UK and the USA, the governments are dictatorial in nature despite the fact that they may have been elected into office. Even though there may be elements of competition in these systems, it is difficult to ensure that the true intention so voters will always be spoken to by elected representatives. The complete hold on power which they enjoy and the lengths to which they are willing to go in order to ensure their incumbency and primcy through manipulating the incentives of individuals from their own and other parties indicates that Lord Hailsham’s critique of modern governments in accurate and applicable.
[1] Democracies are governments in which “supreme power is vested in the people and exercised directly by them or by their elected agents under a free electoral system.” http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/democracy.
[2] Dictatorships are a system of government where the rulers of that country exercise “absolute, imperious, or overbearing power or control” over the rest of the population. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/dictatorships.
[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quintin_Hogg,_Baron_Hailsham_of_St_Marylebone.
[4] Jones, P. R. and Cullis, J. G. 1986. Is Democracy Regressive? Public Choice. Vol 51. No 1. pp 101 – 107.
[5] It is convention from the 20th century onwards that the Prime Minister should be a Member of Parliament sitting in the House of Commons. This is such a strong convention of the British political system that the last Prime Minister who was appointed whilst in the House of Lords, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, renounced his membership of the upper House so that he could contest a by-election to sit as an MP in the House of Commons which he did. This is symbolic of the modern development in the British system that it is the House Commons – as the chamber most representative of the Commoners/everyday men and women of the United Kingdom – which has the moral and political legitimacy to exercise power and govern the country given its election by to that position.
[6] Should he be unable to do so given that he does not command a Commons majority (i.e. his party has the most number of seats in the Commons but does not have an outright majority) he is entitled to form a coalition that would be in the majority. This is what happened this year after the results of the UK 2010 General Election allowed the Conservative Party to hold the most number of seats in the Commons whilst falling short of an absolute majority. The Rt. Hon. David Cameron MP (the leader of the Conservative Party and now the Prime Minister) was called by HRH Queen Elizabeth II form a government, which he did despite his lack of an absolute majority as he had previously agreed to form a coalition with the Liberal Democrats (under the leadership of The Rt. Hon. Nick Clegg MP) which allowed both parties sitting together to command a Commons majority. This is seen as a better alternative to forming a minority government where the party with the largest number of seats but not an absolute majority attempts to govern for as long as it can until such time that it looses the confidence of the House upon which it relies to carry out its political programme. Such was the case with the government of The Rt. Hon. James Callaghan MP.
[7] Secretaries of State (and other invited persons, such as the Chief Whip) being entitled to sit in the Cabinet and are allowed to be referred to as “the Right Honourable” by virtue of their appointnment to the Privy Council; Ministers of State (some of whom may be appointed to the Privy Council for special reasons such as sharing a close political connection to the Prime Minister or for long service, as in the case of The Rt. Hon. Oliver Letwin MP) who serve in various Departments under Secretaries of State; Under-Secretaries who serve below Secretaries of State and Ministers; and Private Parliamentary Secretaries who are not official government Members but who provide political assistance to Secretaries of State/Ministers as the case may be.
[8] For a brief history on the history of Parliament see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Commons_of_the_United_Kingdom.
[9] i.e. the Prime Minister and his Government.
[10] Note 4 supra.
[11] Wolbrecht, C. and Campbell, D. E. 2007. Female Members of Parliament as Political Role Models. American Journal of Political Science. Vol 51. No 4 (October).
[12]Indeed when it comes to voting against their own party in a motion of no confidence (possible although not often the case), MPs are expected to be selfless as they are expected to dismiss a government if they are deserving of it even though (a) they may be voting against their own party (and friends); or (b) the onset of a new general election – which a successful motion of no confidence initiates as a method of replacing the government in which the Commons as the representative chamber of the people – may result in them losing their own seat (especially if on the losing side).
[13] i.e. with a similar number of electors although not necessarily the same size geographically.
[14] Joyce, Peter. 2006. Teach Yourself: Politics. Reading, Berkshire. Hodder Education.
[15] Pancer, S. M., Brown, S. D. and Barr, C. W. 1999. Forming Impressions of Political Leaders: A Cross-national Comparison. Political Psychology. Vol 20. No 2 (June). pp 345 – 368
[16] Heywood, Andrew. 2007. Politics (Third Edition). Hampshire and New York. Palgrave Macmillan
[17] http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/separation-of-powers.html.
[18] http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/checks+and+balances.
[19] This further reemphasises the separation of powers doctrine as the President may be of one party and the Legislature may be in the control of the other. This allows a further bulwark against the overwhelming powers of the Executive and vice versa. This was the case with President Bush post-2006 midterm elections where his own Republican party lost control of Congress to the Democrats which allowed the Democrats to then use their position as an opposition party in control of Congress to curtail the President’s programmes initiative which they – and seemingly the electorate – were opposed to by virtue of being elected as the majority. The positive externality of this system of government is that it allows the electorate to curtail the powers of the President midterm (as happened with Bush Jnr. in 2006, his term ending in 2008) without having to necessarily incur the expense and the logistical burden of a general election. It also acts simultaneously as a referendum on the president’s performance thus far – a poor result indicating that more work would need to be done to secure a second term/that his or her predecessor from their own party has a better chance of winning; whilst a good result boosts the President’s legitimacy and chances of re-election (or in the case of a second-term President, the chances of allowing his own party replacement to succeed him). This happened to Presidents Clinton and Bush Jnr.
[20]See an example of this at http://theweeklywhip.blogspot.com/2010/05/judicial-independence-in-south-africa.html (concerning South Africa’s Superior Courts Bill [2006] and a possible argument as to why the judiciary wields too much power in a democracy).
[21] Note 14 supra for further arguments as to why judicial independence is both legally and politically sound in a democracy.
[22] http://www.indianexpress.com/oldStory/6058/.
[23] Wilson, J. 2008. American Government. USA, Houghton Mifflin Company.
[24] In the UK where there is a more rigid and unitary party structure, this usually refers to the Leader of the Party and his Executive structure of the party – many of whom sit in the government as Cabinet Ministers, etc. In the US this is somewhat different given the country’s federal nature and refers to the decision-makers at the highest level of the part who collude with each other to ensure that the President is able to carry out his agenda. This extends to State Party formations which may use their influence and control to reign in errant Senators/Congressman who threaten the President’s primacy.
[25] Caprara, G. V., Barbarnelli, C. and Zimbardo, P. G. 1999. Personality Profiles of Political Parties. Political Psychology. Vol 20. No 1 (March). pp 175 – 197.
[26] It is important to bear in mind that in the UK the government usually sits with a majority. This means that an opposition will only be successful in managing to defeat the government – even where the government deserves to be defeated – if members of the ruling party (usually those on the backbench) turn against their own leadership. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/2802791.stm for a chronicle of the rebellions that were suffered by the Blair Government. Despite none of them being successful (although many of them should have been) it illustrates to what degree the party elites are able to silence internal dissent when it is often the only type of dissent that may succeed. This essay will point out a t a later stage as to how this will not even happen in the case of a coalition despite the propensity for disagreement as is the case currently in the UK. In the United States, whilst this is not always the case (that the President and his party are in control of both the Presidency and Congress at the same time), we see that: (a) in scenarios that they are, the issues pointed out to by this essay occur anyways; and (b) in scenarios where they are not, the President still has the ability to court members of the opposite party to assist him for whatever reason (explained later) to get his initiatives passed through Congress.
[27]Howard, P. N. 2005. Deep Democracy, Thin Citizenship: The Impact of Digital Media in Political Campaign Strategy. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol 597 (January). pp 153-170
[28] Parties may do this even if it means losing a seat for one election cycle so that they can get rid of persons they deem damaging to their cause.
[29] Williams, P. 2004. Who’s Making UK Foreign Policy. International Affairs (Royal Institute for International Affairs 1944 – ). Vol 80. No 5 (October). pp 911 – 929.
[30] See John Major’s appropriation of Linden B. Johnson’s maxim: it’s better to have the bastards in the tent pissing out, than outside pissing in.” http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/1993/jul/25/politicalnews.uk.
[31] Crowley, J. 2001. The Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities. International Political Science Review. Vol 2. No 1 (Jan). pp 99 – 121.
[32] Which is supposed to be non-partisan by virtue of the fact that it is done on behalf of the state that is supposed to be equally accessed by all people living within the state as well as to provide to them.
[33] Referred to as “pork barrelling” in the USA. http://www.answers.com/topic/pork-barrel.
[34] http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Swing+vote.
[35] Klein, Joe. 2006. Politics Lost. New York. Broadway Books.
[36] Dworkin, R. 2006. Is Democracy Possible Here? Princeton University Press. New Jersey. Princeton.
[37] This obviously ignores the wrath he would face of his party colleagues that may or may not take kindly his so-called collusion.
[38] http://www.c-span.org/guide/congress/glossary/bluedog.htm.
[39] Novkov, J. 2008. Rethinking Race in American Politics. Political Research Quarterly. Vol 61. No 4 (December). pp 649 – 659.
[40] In the UK this is through the application of legislation such as the Human Rights Act 1998 which gave effect to supranational legislation (European Convention on Human Rights) that allows for such a power. In the USA, much like in South Africa, the power of judicial review is guaranteed by the Constitution.
[41] Kennedy, H. 2004. Just Law. Vintage. Great Britain. London
[42] Both the ‘counter-majoritarian dilemma’ and the ‘democratic-deficit’ are explained in Corder, H. 2009. Judicial Authority in a Changing South Africa. University of Cape Town..
[43] Aarts, K. and Semetko, H. A. 2003. The Divided Electorate: Media Use and Political Involvement. The Journal of Politics. Vol 65. No 3 (August). pp 759 – 784.
[44] Sanders, D. and Norris, P. 2005. The Impact of Political Advertising in the 2001 UK General Election. Political Research Quarterly. Vol 58. No 4 (December). pp 525 – 536.
[45] http://www.militant.org.uk/.
[46] http://teapartypatriots.ning.com/.
[47] Holcombe, R. G. 2005. Government Growth in the Twenty-First Century. Public Choice. Vol 124. No 1/2 (July). pp 95 – 114.
[48] Yule, V. 1985. Representative Government. Political Psychology. Vol 6. No 3 (September). pp 519 – 524.
